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INTRODUCTION
This Article provides a summary of federal circuit court
cases decided in 2018. By the end of 2018, every circuit except
for the Eighth has adopted a Two-Part Test for Second
Amendment cases. In Part One, the court determines whether
the challenged law burdens the Second Amendment right. If so,
the court applies heightened scrutiny in Part Two. Courts in
Second Amendment cases almost always apply intermediate
scrutiny, but strict scrutiny and categorical invalidation are also
available.
The Two-Part Test is detailed in our article, The Federal
Circuits’ Second Amendment Doctrines.1 That article reviews
every federal circuit Second Amendment case after District of
Columbia v. Heller (2008), up to approximately August 2016.

I. FIRST CIRCUIT
A. UPHOLDING “MAY ISSUE” CARRY SCHEME, GOULD V.
MORGAN
Under Massachusetts law, licensees may:
purchase, rent, lease, borrow, possess and carry:
(i) firearms, including large capacity firearms,
David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits Second
Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193 (2017) (cited in Pena v.
Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 1004 (9th Cir. 2018) (Bybee, J., dissenting)).
1
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and feeding devices and ammunition therefor,
for all lawful purposes, subject to such
restrictions relative to the possession, use or
carrying of firearms as the licensing authority
deems proper.2
A license may be issued if the applicant “has good reason to fear
injury . . . or for any other reason, including the carrying of
firearms for use in sport or target practice only.”3
For a general carry license, both Boston and Brookline
require applicants to demonstrate that they have a greater need
for self-defense than that of the general public. If an applicant
fails to do so, he might still receive a license, but typically under
specified restrictions. “Boston offers licenses restricted to
employment, hunting and target practice, or sport. For its part,
Brookline offers licenses subject to restrictions for employment,
hunting, target practice, sport, transport, domestic (use only in
and around one's home), or collecting.”4
The plaintiffs challenged the Boston and Brookline
policies after each received a license that restricted the purpose
for which he could carry. For instance, one license was
restricted to employment and sporting purposes. Another was
restricted to hunting and target-practice. The plaintiffs argued
that they had a right to carry firearms generally for self-defense.
The First Circuit phrased the issues as such:
Does the Second Amendment protect the right to
carry a firearm outside the home for selfdefense? And if they prevail on that question,
may the government condition the exercise of
the right to bear arms on a showing that a citizen
has a “good reason” (beyond a generalized
desire for self-defense) for carrying a firearm
outside the home?5
To analyze these questions, the First Circuit adopted the
Two-Part Test for the first time. This development was notable
because previously, the First Circuit relied on the competing
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 131(a).
Id. § 131(d).
4 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 664 (1st Cir. 2018).
5 Id. at 666.
2
3
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test of text, history, and tradition more than any other circuit.
Now, the Eighth Circuit is the only remaining circuit that has
not adopted the Two-Part Test.6
In Part One, the court determined that the right to bear
arms applies beyond the home to some extent:
The Supreme Court's seminal decision
in Heller guides our voyage. The Heller Court
left no doubt that the right to bear arms “for
defense of self, family, and property” was “most
acute” inside the home. 554 U.S. at 628, 128 S.Ct.
2783. If the right existed solely within the home,
the Court's choice of phrase would have been
peculiar. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933,
935-36 (7th Cir. 2012). So, too, the Heller Court
stated that prohibitions on carrying firearms in
“sensitive places” are “presumptively lawful,”
554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26, 128 S.Ct. 2783—a
pronouncement that would have been
completely unnecessary if the Second
Amendment right did not extend beyond the
home at all. Reading these tea leaves, we
view Heller as implying that the right to carry a
firearm for self-defense guaranteed by the
Second Amendment is not limited to the home.7
In Part Two, however, the court determined that the
application beyond the home is very limited, and that the core
of the right is in the home:
We make explicit today what was implicit
in Hightower: that the core Second Amendment
right is limited to self-defense in the home. . . .
this configuration of the Second Amendment's
core interest is consistent with Heller, in which
the Court declared that the home is where “the
need for defense of self, family, and property is
This does not necessarily mean that the Supreme Court will approve
the Two-Part Test. As Judge Bibas recently pointed out, “Heller
overruled nine” circuit courts. Ass'n of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol
Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. New Jersey, 910 F.3d 106, 134 (3d Cir.
2018) (Bibas, J., dissenting).
7 Gould, 907 F.3d at 670.
6
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most acute,” such that the Second Amendment
“elevates above all other interests the ... defense
of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 628, 635, 128
S.Ct. 2783; see GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v.
Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that the Heller Court “went to great
lengths to emphasize the special place that the
home—an individual's private property—
occupies in our society”).
Societal considerations also suggest that the
public carriage of firearms, even for the purpose
of self-defense, should be regarded as falling
outside the core of the Second Amendment
right. The home is where families reside, where
people keep their most valuable possessions,
and where they are at their most vulnerable
(especially while sleeping at night). Outside the
home, society typically relies on police officers,
security guards, and the watchful eyes of
concerned citizens to mitigate threats. This same
panoply of protections is much less effective
inside the home. Police may not be able to
respond to calls for help quickly, so an
individual within the four walls of his own
house may need to provide for the protection of
himself and his family in case of emergency.
Last—but surely not least—the availability of
firearms inside the home implicates the safety
only of those who live or visit there, not the
general public.
Viewed against this backdrop, the right to selfdefense—upon which the plaintiffs rely—is at its
zenith inside the home. This right is plainly more
circumscribed outside the home. “[O]utside the
home, firearm rights have always been more
limited, because public safety interests often
outweigh individual interests in selfdefense.” United States v. Masciandaro, 638
F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011). These truths are
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especially evident in densely populated urban
areas like Boston and Brookline.8
Because “[p]ublic carriage of firearms for self-defense
falls outside the perimeter of this core right,” the court found
intermediate scrutiny appropriate.9 “It cannot be gainsaid that
Massachusetts has compelling governmental interests in both
public safety and crime prevention,” so the question was
whether the licensing scheme was substantially related to those
interests.10
Here, the fit between the asserted governmental
interests and the means chosen to advance them
is close enough to pass intermediate scrutiny.
The challenged regime does not infringe at all on
the core Second Amendment right of a citizen to
keep arms in his home for the purpose of selfdefense. Outside the home, the regime arguably
does burden a citizen's non-core Second
Amendment right. See supra Sections III.B,
III.C. But in allocating this burden, the
Massachusetts legislature was cognizant that
firearms can present a threat to public safety.
Striving to strike a balance, the legislature took
note that some individuals might have a
heightened need to carry firearms for selfdefense and allowed local licensing authorities
to take a case-by-case approach in deciding
whether a particular “applicant has good reason
to fear injury.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(d).
In addition, the legislature made appropriate
provisions for restricted licenses, thus ensuring
that individuals may carry firearms while
engaging in hunting, target-shooting, and a host
of other pursuits. Those same protections extend
to individuals who need to carry firearms for
work-related reasons.11

Id. at 671–72.
Id. at 672.
10 Id. at 673.
11 Id. at 674.
8
9
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Like some other circuits, the First Circuit applied the
intermediate scrutiny rule that the law must not be
substantially more burdensome than necessary:
the fit between the asserted governmental
interests and the means chosen by the legislature
to advance them need only be substantial in
order to withstand intermediate scrutiny. . . .
Courts have described this requirement in
various ways. A typical formulation—with
which we agree—describes it as “a reasonable fit
. . . such that the law does not burden more
conduct than is reasonably necessary.”12
The court determined that the may-issue carry law did not
burden more conduct than reasonably necessary and upheld it.

II. SECOND CIRCUIT
It is no secret that the Second Amendment is often
treated as a second-class right in the Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits.13 Within this trifecta of circuits, the Second Circuit is
the most hostile. Second Amendment plaintiffs have been
known to win cases in federal district courts in the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits. In the Ninth, they sometimes even win before
three-judge panels—although so far, such wins have later been
overturned en banc. In the Second Circuit, hostility to the Second
Amendment is more hegemonic.14

Id. (quoting Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013)).
See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Data Indicate Second Amendment
Underenforcement, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 79 (2018).
14 Thus, in a case challenging New York’s vague statute on gravity
knives (which New York City police used against common folding
knives), the plaintiffs wisely did not frame the case as a Second
Amendment issue, even though knives are Second Amendment arms.
See Copeland v. Vance, 893 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2018); see generally David
B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Knives and the
Second Amendment, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 175 (2013) (cited with
approval in Seattle v. Evans, 366 P.3d 906 (Wash. 2015) (by both
majority and dissent)); State v. Herrmann, 873 N.W.2d 257 (Wisc. Ct.
App. 2015); State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165 (Conn. 2014); People v.
Trowells, No. 3015/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2014).
12
13
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In the last year, the Second Circuit’s most important
decision upheld a ban on licensed handgun owners taking their
registered handguns out of New York City. A somewhat betterreasoned decision upheld the federal Gun Control Act’s
prohibition on firearms possession by persons who were
dishonorably discharged from the military.
A. CITY MAY PROHIBIT LICENSED HANDGUN OWNERS FROM

TAKING THEIR HANDGUNS OUT OF THE CITY. NEW YORK
STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASS’N, INC. V. CITY OF NEW YORK

In New York, one must obtain a license to own a
handgun. There are two types of licenses: “carry” licenses and
“premises” licenses.15 “A carry license allows an individual to
‘have and carry [a] concealed’ handgun ‘without regard to
employment or place of possession.’” But it is only granted
“when proper cause exists” for the issuance of the license.16
“Proper cause” is not defined by the Penal Law,
but New York State courts have defined the term
to include carrying a handgun for target
practice, hunting, or self-defense. When an
applicant demonstrates proper cause to carry a
handgun for target practice or hunting, the
licensing officer may restrict a carry license “to
the purposes that justified the issuance.”17
In New York City, carry permits are issued to retired
law enforcement, celebrities, and other favored persons. In
contrast, the city’s police department does (reluctantly and
slowly) issue to ordinary citizens licenses to keep handguns in
their homes. A “premises” license is limited to the premise
specified on the license. The firearm can be removed from that
premise for only very limited reasons, such as to “transport
her/his handgun(s) directly to and from an authorized small
arms range/shooting club, unloaded, in a locked container, the
ammunition to be carried separately.”18 Administratively, the
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 400.00(2)(a), (f).
Id. § 400.00(2)(f).
17 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883
F.3d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 2018) (“NYSRPA”).
18 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a) (2019).
15
16
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city’s police department has declared that an “authorized”
shooting range is only a range located in New York City.
The plaintiffs alleged that the limitations of their
premises licenses violated the Second Amendment, since they
wanted to transport their firearms beyond their premises for
various reasons not included in the statute or in the New York
City regulations.
Specifically, one plaintiff wanted to take his handgun
licensed for his residence in New York City to his second home
in Hancock, New York. Other plaintiffs wanted to take their
handguns licensed to premises in New York City to out-of-city
firing ranges and shooting competitions.
The court skipped immediately to Part Two of the TwoPart Test: “At the first step, the Plaintiffs argue that Rule 5-23
impinges on conduct protected by the Second Amendment. We
need not decide whether that is so, because, as explained below,
the Rule passes constitutional muster under intermediate
scrutiny.”19
The law that prohibited one plaintiff from taking his
firearm to his second home warranted mere intermediate
scrutiny because he could possibly acquire a separate firearm
for that second home.
The prohibition on taking firearms outside the city for
range training and shooting competitions similarly warranted
merely intermediate scrutiny. The court recognized the
importance of training, but only to the extent that it was
necessary to acquire and maintain the skill necessary to protect
oneself and family, and the general public:
restrictions that limit the ability of firearms
owners to acquire and maintain proficiency in
the use of their weapons can rise to a level that
significantly burdens core Second Amendment
protections. Possession of firearms without
adequate training and skill does nothing to
protect, and much to endanger, the gun owner,
his or her family, and the general public.
Accordingly, we may assume that the ability to
obtain firearms training and engage in firearm
practice is sufficiently close to core Second
Amendment concerns that regulations that
19

NYSRPA, 883 F.3d at 55 (quotations and citations omitted).
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sharply restrict that ability to obtain such
training could impose substantial burdens on
core Second Amendment rights. Some form of
heightened scrutiny would be warranted in such
cases, however, not because live-fire target
shooting is itself a core Second Amendment
right, but rather because, and only to the extent
that, regulations amounting to a ban (either
explicit or functional) on obtaining firearms
training and practice substantially burden the
core right to keep and use firearms in selfdefense in the home. Indeed, if the Plaintiffs'
broader argument were accepted, every
regulation that applied to businesses that
provide firearms training or firing-range use
would itself require heightened scrutiny, a result
far from anything the Supreme Court has
required.20
The court noted that the city’s “Rule 5-23 allows a holder
of a premises license to take the handgun licensed for his or her
New York City premises to an authorized firing range in the
City to engage in practice, training exercises, and shooting
competitions”21 and that “[t]he record evidence demonstrates
that seven firing ranges in New York City are available to any
premises license-holder.”22
The court upheld the ban under intermediate scrutiny
based on an apparent distrust of licensed armed citizens in
general:
In a detailed affidavit, the former Commander of
the License Division, Andrew Lunetta,
discussed why taking a licensed handgun to a
second home or a shooting competition outside
the City, even under the restrictions imposed by
the Rule for permitted transportation,
constitutes a potential threat to public safety. He
explained that premises license holders “are just
as susceptible as anyone else to stressful
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 59.
22 Id. at 60.
20
21
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situations,” including driving situations that can
lead to road rage, “crowd situations,
demonstrations, family disputes,” and other
situations “where it would be better to not have
the presence of a firearm.” Accordingly, he
stated, the City has a legitimate need to control
the presence of firearms in public, especially
those held by individuals who have only a
premises license, and not a carry license. He
went on to discuss how “public safety will be
compromised”
unless
the
regulations
concerning when and where premises licensees
can transport their firearms “can be effectively
monitored and enforced, and are not easily
ignored or susceptible to being violated.”23
Lunetta added examples of “abuses” that occurred when
citizens were allowed to transport their handguns to out-of-city
shooting ranges: licensees traveling “with loaded firearms,
licensees found with firearms nowhere near the vicinity of an
authorized range, licensees taking their firearms on airplanes,
and licensees . . . with their firearms during hours where no
authorized range was open.”24 Based largely on Lunetta’s
affidavit, the regulation was upheld.

B. UPHOLDING PROHIBITED PERSONS LAW FOR PERSONS
DISHONORABLY DISCHARGED FROM THE MILITARY.
UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ
Oscar Sanchez paid Jose Jimenez $40 to drive him to a
parking lot where Sanchez had arranged to sell 20 handguns to
someone who turned out to be an undercover NYPD detective.
Sanchez transferred a black bag to the detective’s car, but no

Id. at 63 (citations omitted).
Id. (brackets in original). In 2019, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case. Attempting to moot the case, New York City
repealed the regulation. At oral argument on Dec. 2, 2019, the City
admitted that ending the regulation had not harmed public safety in
the slightest. New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. City of New York,
No.
18-280,
Transcript
at
52
(Dec.
2,
2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transc
ripts/2019/18-280_j4ek.pdf.
23
24
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guns were inside—only a box of Capri Sun and a carjack. No
exchange of firearms occurred.
As part of the operation, after Jimenez and Sanchez
drove away, two ATF agents pulled them over. During this
stop, Sanchez took the round chambered in the handgun he
carried and handed it to Jimenez. Soon after, the agents
discovered the round and further discovered that Jimenez had
previously been dishonorably discharged from the Marines.25
Jimenez was subsequently convicted for violating 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(6), which prohibits anyone who “has been
discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions” from possessing firearms or ammunition “in or
affecting commerce.” Jimenez appealed, arguing that §
922(g)(6) violates the Second Amendment.
In this case, the Second Circuit became the first Circuit
Court to consider the constitutionality of the ban since Heller.
Applying the Two-Part Test, the court quickly jumped
to Part Two:
Proceeding with our usual caution, we find that
it is unnecessary to determine whether Jimenez
can claim any Second Amendment protections
because even if we assume (without deciding)
that he can, we conclude that those protections
do not preclude his conviction under Section
922(g)(6).26
The court decided intermediate scrutiny was
appropriate, because “those who, like Jimenez, have been
found guilty of felony-equivalent conduct by a military tribunal
are not among those ‘law-abiding and responsible’ persons
whose interests in possessing firearms are at the Amendment’s
core.”27
Jimenez had served “18 months in a military prison for conspiracy
to sell military property, wrongful disposition of military property,
use and possession of a controlled substance, and conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces, in violation of 10 U.S.C. §§
881, 908, 912a, 934. He had been convicted of these offenses after
confessing to using and dealing ecstasy and to possessing and selling
firearms and night vision goggles that had been stolen from the
military.” United States v. Jimenez, 895 F.3d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 2018).
26 Id. at 234.
27 Id. at 235.
25
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Intermediate scrutiny requires the government to prove
that the law is substantially related to an important
governmental interest. The court held that the government did
so, even though “the government presents no studies, no
empirical data, no expert testimony, no legislative findings...to
substantiate the belief that no dishonorably discharged veteran
may be trusted with a bullet.”28
The government met its burden of proof because “the
government relie[d] on the fact that those convicted of felonies
have been widely found to be more dangerous with deadly
weapons [and] Jimenez was discharged for felony-equivalent
conduct:”29
Section 922(g)(6) became law as part of the Gun
Control Act of 1968, which creates similar bans
for other “special risk groups”: felons, fugitives,
illegal drug users and addicts, the mentally
incompetent, those who have “been committed
to a mental institution,” undocumented
immigrants, individuals with nonimmigrant
visas, those who have renounced United States
citizenship, those subject to a domestic violence
order of protection, and those convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. When
the military discharge provision of the Gun
Control Act was introduced, it was treated as of
a piece with all of these special risk groups and
specifically with the felon ban. That portion of
the Gun Control Act was meant to deprive those
who had demonstrated an inability or
unwillingness to take others’ safety into account,
or otherwise might be especially dangerous with
a gun, from possessing deadly weapons.30
Does the court’s reasoning allow a class of persons to be
prohibited from exercising a constitutional right simply
because Congress listed them among other classes that could
justifiably be prohibited? Perhaps not, for the court elaborated:

Id. at 236 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
30 Id. at 337 (internal citations omitted).
28
29
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There is no reason to think that Jimenez is more
likely to handle a gun responsibly just because
his conviction for dealing drugs and stolen
military equipment (including firearms)
occurred in a military tribunal rather than in
state or federal court.31
Thus, the prohibition for persons with dishonorable discharges
was, in the case of Jimenez, the equivalent of prohibitive felony
convictions. The court’s reasoning should not be extended to
dishonorable discharges for other reasons, such as to persons
who received a dishonorable discharge for having a
homosexual orientation.
Lastly, Jimenez attempted to distinguish ammunition
from firearms, arguing that “‘[a] bullet is categorically less
dangerous than a gun’ since ‘even an unloaded gun can be used
to menace, threaten, or strike a victim.’” But the court was
unpersuaded. As the court pointed out, “[g]uns are not
regulated because they can be used as blunt objects: tire irons
and baseball bats remain legal. Guns are regulated because of
their capacity to launch bullets at speeds sufficient to cleave
flesh and shatter bone. Without bullets, guns do not have that
capacity.”32

III. THIRD CIRCUIT
A. UPHOLDING A BAN ON MAGAZINES WITH A GREATER
THAN 10-ROUND CAPACITY, ASS'N OF NEW JERSEY RIFLE
& PISTOL CLUBS, INC. V. ATTORNEY GEN. NEW JERSEY
In June 2018, New Jersey reduced its 15-round magazine
limit established in 199033 to 10 rounds.34 Owners of the newlyoutlawed magazines had until December 10, 2018 to “[t]ransfer
the semi-automatic rifle or magazine to any person or firm
lawfully entitled to own or possess that firearm or magazine,”
“[r]ender the semi-automatic rifle or magazine inoperable or
permanently modify a large capacity ammunition magazine to

Id.
Id. at 238.
33 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-1(y), -3(j) (2014).
34 Id. § 2C:39-19.
31
32
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accept 10 rounds or less,” or “[v]oluntarily surrender the semiautomatic rifle or magazine.”35
Before beginning its two-part analysis, the court had to
determine whether magazines are “arms” under the Second
Amendment. It decided that “[b]ecause magazines feed
ammunition into certain guns, and ammunition is necessary for
such a gun to function as intended, magazines are ‘arms’ within
the meaning of the Second Amendment.”36
In Part One of the Two-Part Test, the court considers
whether the challenged regulation burdens the Second
Amendment. For an arms ban, the court must “consider
whether the type of arm at issue is commonly owned”37 and
“typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes.”38 The court acknowledged that “millions of
magazines are owned, often come factory standard with semiautomatic weapons, are typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for hunting, pest-control, and occasionally self-defense,
and there is no longstanding history of LCM [large-capacity
magazine] regulation.”39 Nonetheless, the court proceeded to
Part Two merely “assum[ing] without deciding that LCMs are
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes
and that they are entitled to Second Amendment protection.”40
In determining the level of scrutiny in Part Two, the
court found that the law “does not severely burden the core
Second Amendment right to self-defense in the home for five
reasons.”41
“First, the Act, which prohibits possession of magazines
with capacities over ten rounds, does not categorically ban a
class of firearms. The ban applies only to magazines capable of

Id.
Ass'n of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. New
Jersey, 910 F.3d 106, 116 (3d Cir. 2018) (“ANJRPC”).
37 Id. The court stated that “‘[c]ommon use’ is not dispositive since
weapons illegal at the time of a lawsuit would not be (or at least
should not be) in common use and yet still may be entitled to
protection.” Id. at 117 n.15 (citing Friedman v. City of Highland Park,
784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir.2015)).
38 Id. at 116.
39 Id.at 116–17 (citations omitted).
40 Id. at 117.
41 Id.
35
36
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holding more than ten rounds and thus restricts possession of
only a subset of magazines that are over a certain capacity.”42
“Second, unlike the ban in Heller, the Act is not ‘a
prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly
chosen by American society for [self-defense in the home].’ . . .
The record here demonstrates that LCMs are not well-suited for
self-defense.”43
“Third, also unlike the handgun ban in Heller, a
prohibition on large-capacity magazines does not effectively
disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend
themselves. Put simply, the Act here does not take firearms out
of the hands of law-abiding citizens, which was the result of the
law at issue in Heller. The Act allows law-abiding citizens to
retain magazines, and it has no impact on the many other
firearm options that individuals have to defend themselves in
their home.”44
“Fourth, the Act does not render the arm at issue here
incapable of operating as intended. New Jersey citizens may
still possess and utilize magazines, simply with five fewer
rounds per magazine.”45
“Fifth, ‘it cannot be the case that possession of a firearm
in the home for self-defense is a protected form of possession
under all circumstances. By this rationale, any type of firearm
possessed in the home would be protected merely because it
could be used for self-defense.’”46
Since “it does not severely burden, and in fact respects,
the core of the Second Amendment right,” the court applied
intermediate scrutiny.47
The Third Circuit determined the ban “reasonably fits
the State’s interest in promoting public safety”48 because “[n]ot
only will the LCM ban reduce the number of shots fired and the
resulting harm, it will present opportunities for victims to flee
and bystanders to intervene.”49

Id. (quotation omitted).
Id. at 118 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628).
44 Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
45 Id.
46 Id. (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir.
2010)).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 119.
49 Id.
42
43
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Recognizing its need to consider less burdensome
alternatives in intermediate scrutiny, the court found that “the
Act does not burden more conduct than reasonably necessary”
because it “does not disarm an individual” and it “imposes no
limit on the number of firearms or magazines or amount of
ammunition a person may lawfully possess.”50
Judge Bibas dissented. He first wrote that strict scrutiny
was more appropriate than intermediate scrutiny. Since the
magazines are commonly owned for self-defense in the home,
the ban burdened the core of the Second Amendment right—
and when the core of other constitutional rights are burdened,
the law is either categorically unconstitutional51 or strict
scrutiny applies.52
Judge Bibas argued that the majority committed several
errors in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny:
First and most fundamentally, the majority
weighs the merits of the right to possess large
magazines.53 . . . The majority observes that the
record is unclear on how many people fire more
than ten rounds in self-defense . . . But the
Second Amendment provides a right to
“keep and bear Arms.” It protects possessing
arms, not just firing them. So the majority misses
a key part of the Second Amendment. The
Id. at 122.
Id. at 127 (Bibas, J., dissenting). Judge Bibas cited Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial) and Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause).
52 Id. at 127 (Bibas, J., dissenting) (“The ‘bedrock principle’ of the Free
Speech Clause forbids limiting speech just because it is ‘offensive or
disagreeable.’ Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105
L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). So content-based speech restrictions get strict
scrutiny. Id. at 412, 109 S.Ct. 2533. The Free Exercise Clause was
designed as a bulwark against ‘religious persecution and
intolerance.’ Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted). So laws that target religion or religious conduct get
strict scrutiny. Id. at 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217. And the Equal Protection
Clause targets classifications that historically were used to
discriminate. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236,
115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). So laws that classify based on
race get strict scrutiny. Id. at 235, 115 S.Ct. 2097.”).
53 Id. at 128 (Bibas, J., dissenting).
50
51
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analysis cannot turn on how many bullets are
fired.54
Moreover, it is contrary to the way courts apply
heightened scrutiny to select the tier of scrutiny after
considering the severity of the burden. “Polling defensive gun
uses and alternatives to set a level of scrutiny, as the majority
does, boils down to forbidden interest-balancing. Any gun
regulation limits gun use for both crime and self-defense. And
any gun restriction other than a flat ban on guns will leave
alternative weapons. So the majority’s test amounts to weighing
benefits against burdens.”55
Additionally,
though it denies it, the majority effectively
cabins Heller’s core to bans on handguns. . . .
People commonly possess large magazines to
defend themselves and their families in their
homes. That is exactly why banning them
burdens the core Second Amendment right. For
any other right, that would be the end of our
analysis; for the Second Amendment, the
majority demands something much more
severe.56
Judge Bibas argued that the majority not only chose the
wrong standard of review, it misapplied the standard.
Specifically, the government had not been required to (and did
not) prove that the law was effective;57 the government was not
required to prove that substantially less burdensome
alternatives were unavailable;58 and the majority considered
how often the banned magazines are actually used in selfdefense, which was inconclusive and irrelevant.59
Consequently, “[t]he majority’s watered-down ‘intermediate

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
56 Id. at 129–30 (Bibas, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 130–131 (Bibas, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 130–133 (Bibas, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 133 (Bibas, J., dissenting).
54
55

92

7 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2020)

scrutiny’ is really rational-basis review,” far different from the
intermediate scrutiny applied when other rights are at issue.60

IV. FOURTH CIRCUIT
E. UPHOLDING BAN ON
DRUGS. U.S. V. YATES

FELONS AND USERS OF ILLEGAL

A jury convicted Meredith Yates and Kevin Vanover of
several firearms offenses, including possession of a firearm by
a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2);
possession of a firearm by an illegal drug user in violation of §
922(g)(3), 924(a)(2); and possession of an unregistered firearm
in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), 5871 (2012).61
On appeal, Yates and Vanover argued “that the Second
Amendment does not allow the government to limit gun
ownership based on prior convictions or marijuana use.”62 But
Heller stated that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons. . . .”63 And the Fourth Circuit previously held
in U.S. v. Carter that the ban on illegal drug users
“proportionally advances the government's legitimate goal of
preventing gun violence and is therefore constitutional under
the Second Amendment.”64 So the conviction was quickly
affirmed.
Yates and Vanover petitioned for certiorari on October
31, 2018. The petition was denied on December 3, 2018.

V. FIFTH CIRCUIT
A. UPHOLDING BAN ON HANDGUN SALES TO RESIDENTS OF
OTHER STATES. MANCE V. SESSIONS
District of Columbia residents Andrew and Tracy
Hanson traveled to Texas to purchase handguns from Fredric
Mance, a federally licensed firearms dealer (“FFL”). They did

Id. (Bibas, J., dissenting).
United States v. Yates, 746 Fed. Appx. 162, 163 (4th Cir. 2018).
62 Id. at 164.
63 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
64 United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2014).
60
61
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so because D.C. has only one FFL, who has no inventory and
charges $125 for each firearms transfer.
The Hansons could legally purchase firearms under the
laws of both Texas and the District of Columbia. The District’s
laws allow a resident to buy handguns outside the District.
However, federal law prohibits an FFL from selling handguns
to out-of-state residents.65 Federal law would permit Mance to
65

...

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) and (b)(3) provide that:
(a) It shall be unlawful—

(3) for any person, other than a licensed
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or
licensed collector to transport into or receive in the
State where he resides (or if the person is a
corporation or other business entity, the State where
it maintains a place of business) any firearm
purchased or otherwise obtained by such person
outside that State, except that this paragraph (A) shall
not preclude any person who lawfully acquires a
firearm by bequest or intestate succession in a State
other than his State of residence from transporting
the firearm into or receiving it in that State, if it is
lawful for such person to purchase or possess such
firearm in that State, (B) shall not apply to the
transportation or receipt of a firearm obtained in
conformity with subsection (b)(3) of this section, and
(C) shall not apply to the transportation of any
firearm acquired in any State prior to the effective
date of this chapter....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any licensed
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or
licensed collector to sell or deliver—...
(3) any firearm to any person who the
licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe
does not reside in (or if the person is a corporation or
other business entity, does not maintain a place of
business in) the State in which the licensee's place of
business is located, except that this paragraph (A)
shall not apply to the sale or delivery of any rifle or
shotgun to a resident of a State other than a State in
which the licensee's place of business is located if the
transferee meets in person with the transferor to
accomplish the transfer, and the sale, delivery, and
receipt fully comply with the legal conditions of sale
in both such States (and any licensed manufacturer,
importer or dealer shall be presumed, for purposes of
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transfer the firearms to the FFL in the District of Columbia, but
the Hansons objected to the fee. Instead, they challenged the
constitutionality of the federal scheme.66
The Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to the law,
assuming without deciding that it was the correct standard.
After explaining why Congress passed the interstate sales ban
in 1968,67 the court had to determine whether the law was
this subparagraph, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, to have had actual knowledge of the State
laws and published ordinances of both States), and
(B) shall not apply to the loan or rental of a firearm to
any person for temporary use for lawful sporting
purposes....
27 C.F.R. § 478.99(a), provides:
Interstate sales or deliveries. A licensed
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or
licensed collector shall not sell or deliver any firearm
to any person not licensed under this part and who
the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe
does not reside in (or if a corporation or other
business entity, does not maintain a place of business
in) the State in which the licensee's place of business
or activity is located: Provided, That the foregoing
provisions of this paragraph (1) shall not apply to the
sale or delivery of a rifle or shotgun (curio or relic, in
the case of a licensed collector) to a resident of a State
other than the State in which the licensee's place of
business or collection premises is located if the
requirements of § 478.96(c) are fully met, and (2) shall
not apply to the loan or rental of a firearm to any
person for temporary use for lawful sporting
purposes (see § 478.97).
66 See Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2018).
67

The district court accepted that when Congress
enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (Crime Control Act) and the Gun Control
Act of 1968 there was an actual problem in need of
solving. The findings and declarations set forth in the
Crime Control Act reflect that Congress was of the
view that “the existing Federal controls over
[widespread traffic in firearms] do not adequately
enable the States to control this traffic within their
own borders through the exercise of their police
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narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in the present
day:
The overarching question in a strict-scrutiny
analysis of the laws and regulations at issue, it
seems to us, is whether an in-state sales
requirement remains justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest after the Gun Control Act was
amended by the Brady Act and in light of federal
regulations promulgated after the in-state sales
requirement was enacted.68
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the ban passed strict
scrutiny. “All parties to this suit concede that there is a
compelling government interest in preventing circumvention
of the handgun laws of various states.”69 And the law was
power.” Congress had concluded that there was a
“serious problem of individuals going across State
lines to procure firearms which they could not
lawfully obtain or possess in their own State,” and
these interstate purchases were accomplished
“without the knowledge of ... local authorities.”
Congress found that individuals circumventing the
laws of the state in which they resided included
“large numbers of criminals and juveniles.” Congress
had additionally concluded “that the acquisition on a
mail-order basis of firearms other than a rifle or
shotgun by nonlicensed individuals, from a place
other than their State of residence, has materially
tended to thwart the effectiveness of State laws and
regulations, and local ordinances ....” Similarly,
Congress found:
that the sale or other disposition of
concealable weapons by importers, manufacturers,
and dealers holding Federal licenses, to nonresidents
of the State in which the licensees’ places of business
are located, has tended to make ineffective the laws,
regulations, and ordinances in the several States and
local jurisdictions regarding such firearms. . . .
Id. at 705–06 (citations omitted).
68 Id. at 706.
69 Id. at 707.
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narrowly tailored because the alternative of requiring every
FFL to master the laws of all 50 states and the District of
Columbia was unreasonable:
There are more than 123,000 FFLs nationwide. It
is unrealistic to expect that each of them can
become, and remain, knowledgeable about the
handgun laws of the 50 states and the District of
Columbia, and the local laws within the 50 states
and the District. The district court relied on 27
C.F.R. § 478.24 to support the conclusion that
FFLs can “ensure that their firearms transactions
comport with state and local law.” But the
compilation of state gun laws by the Director of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives is more than 500 pages long, and it
provides the full text of those laws. FFLs are not
engaged in the practice of law, and we do not
expect even an attorney in one state to master the
laws of 49 other states in a particular area.
Additionally, the compilation on which the
district court relied is only updated annually.
The laws of the various states differ as to who
may lawfully possess a firearm. All but one state
(Vermont) prohibits possession of a firearm by a
felon, but the definitions of “felony” differ.
Restrictions based on mental illness vary among
the states. Some states prohibit the purchase of a
firearm by drug abusers, and some restrict
purchases by those who have abused alcohol.
It is reasonable, however, for the federal
government to expect that an FFL located in a
state, and subject to state and local laws, can
master and remain current on the firearm laws
of that state. The in-state sales requirement is
narrowly tailored to assure that an FFL who
actually delivers a handgun to a buyer can
reasonably be expected to know and comply
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with the laws of the state in which the delivery
occurs.70
According to the Fifth Circuit, it did not matter that
federal laws allow interstate long gun sales (with the consent of
both states). Obviously, FFLs are expected to be competent at
complying with the long gun sales laws of every state. But the
court explained that “at least some states have regulated the
sale of handguns more extensively than they have regulated the
sale of long guns.”71 Moreover, handguns were used more
commonly in the crimes that inspired the Gun Control Act.
In fact, compliance with foreign state handgun laws is
not particularly more difficult than compliance with such laws
for handguns. As the Fifth Circuit admitted, a federal statute
requires the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (“ATF”) to annually publish a book of the relevant
gun laws of every state and of every locality therein. The book
is supposed to be made available to FFLs so that they can
examine and obey the laws of other states. Thanks to the
worldwide web, that book is now readily available and can be
updated as often at ATF wishes.
On July 20, 2018, the Fifth Circuit denied a petition for
rehearing en banc by an 8-7 vote. The dissenting judges issued
three separate dissentals. Judge Elrod, joined by judges Smith,
Jones, Willett, Ho, Duncan, and Engelhardt argued that the
Two-Part Test that the Fifth Circuit applied, which most Circuit
Courts have adopted, is inappropriate under Heller. Rather,
Judge Jones believes an analysis based on text, history, and
tradition is most consistent with Heller.72 This is the test the First
Circuit had used prior to Gould,73 and notably, it is the test
advocated by then-Judge Kavanaugh in the D.C. Circuit.74
Judge Willett, joined by the other six dissenting judges,
argued that the court should rehear the case en banc to
determine the appropriate test: “How should judges evaluate

Id. at 707–08 (citations omitted).
Id. at 708.
72 Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2018). Judge Elrod
made a similar argument in a 2012 dissent. Houston v. City of New
Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448–452 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., dissenting).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009).
74 See Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
70
71
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laws that burden Americans’ Second Amendment rights—tiers
of scrutiny vs. ‘text, history, and tradition’?”75
Judge Ho—joined by the six other dissenters—wrote
that the law fails strict scrutiny. He pointed out that the law was
not the least restrictive means available because a law could
serve the same purpose while allowing an FFL to deal with
residents of two states:
The Government does not contend (nor could it)
that a dealer is fully capable of complying with
the laws of one state, but incapable of complying
with the laws of two. This alone demonstrates
that a categorical ban on all interstate handgun
sales is over-inclusive—it prohibits a significant
number of transactions that fully comply with
state law.76
Judge Ho additionally pointed out that even theoretically FFLs
would not actually have to learn the laws of all 50 states because
most states rely on the same National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS):
36 states think that relying on NICS adequately
vindicates their interests. According to an FBI
report cited by the Government, 36 states—
including every state in this circuit, as well as the
District of Columbia—rely solely on NICS to run
background checks. See FBI Criminal Justice
Information Services, National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS) Operations 3
(2014),
available
at
https://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/nics/repor
ts/2014-operations-report.

Mance, 896 F.3d at 398 (Willett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 402 (Ho, J., dissenting). Indeed, the original 1968 Gun Control
Act had also banned interstate long gun sales, but had allowed
interstate long gun sales between contiguous states as long as both
states enacted authorizing legislation. The interstate long gun sales
ban was repealed by the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986;
today, a FFL in one state can sell to a resident of any other state, as
long as both states consent.
75
76
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What’s more, the fact that nearly three-quarters
of states rely entirely on NICS, and not on their
own databases, further demonstrates why the
interstate sales ban serves little purpose: If a D.C.
resident wishes to buy a handgun, the dealer
will run the same NICS background check,
regardless of whether the dealer is based in D.C.,
Texas, or most other states. And in any event,
even assuming the panel is correct that better
information sharing would make the system
more effective, that only furthers the point here:
There are less restrictive alternatives to ensure
compliance with state handgun laws.77
Judge Ho concluded by pointing out the irony of
justifying additional restrictions on the basis that the existing
restrictions are too complex to be understood on their own:
The Government’s defense of the federal ban—
that state handgun laws are too complex to
obey—is not just wrong under established
precedent, it is troubling for a more fundamental
reason. If handgun laws are too complex for lawabiding citizens to follow, the answer is not to
impose even more restrictive rules on the
American people. The answer is to make the
laws easier for all to understand and follow. The
Government’s
proposed
prophylaxis—to
protect against the violations of the few, we must
burden the constitutional rights of the many—
turns the Second Amendment on its head. Our
Founders crafted a Constitution to promote the
liberty of the individual, not the convenience of
the Government.78
Notably, states that believe their handgun laws are too
complex for nonresident sellers to comprehend remain free to
prohibit residents from buying out-of-state. The practical effect
of the federal ban is only to prohibit handgun sales that are
permitted by the seller’s state and the buyer’s state.
77
78

Id. at 403 (Ho, J., dissenting).
Id. at 405 (Ho, J., dissenting).
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The plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari in what became
Mance v. Whitaker on November 19, 2018. The petition is still
pending.

F. CAMPUS CARRY LAW UPHELD, GLASS V. PAXTON
Texas enacted a Campus Carry Law in 2015, allowing
certain permitholders to carry concealed handguns on college
campuses.79 The law allows public colleges to impose
reasonable regulations, but prevents them from prohibiting the
carrying of handguns.80 “For example, the law permits public
colleges to establish regulations concerning the storage of
handguns in residence halls.”81
“To become a license holder (with some exceptions), the
applicant must be a Texas resident who is at least 21 years old,
has not been convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanors, is
not chemically dependent, has participated in handgun
training, and has passed a proficiency examination.”82
Three University professors, including Dr. Jennifer
Glass, challenged the Campus Carry Law. For simplicity’s sake,
the Fifth Circuit referred only to Glass; we will do the same.
Glass raised three claims: (1) “that the law and policy violate
her First Amendment right to academic freedom by chilling her
speech inside the classroom;” (2) “that the law and policy
violate her rights under the Second Amendment because
firearm usage in her presence is not sufficiently ‘wellregulated’;” and (3) “that the law and policy violate her right to
equal protection because the University lacks a rational basis
for determining where students can or cannot concealed-carry
handguns on campus.”83
In support of her First Amendment claim, Glass argued
that “her classroom speech would be ‘dampened to some
degree by the fear’ it could initiate gun violence in the class by
students who have ‘one or more handguns hidden but at the
ready if the gun owner is moved to anger and impulsive action.’
In an affidavit she expressed particular concern for ‘religiously
Codified as Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.2031.
§ 411.2031(d-1).
81 Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Tex. Gov’t
Code § 411.2031(d)).
82 Glass, 900 F. 3d at 236 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 411.172, 411.174,
411.188).
83 Id. at 237.
79
80
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conservative students [who] have extreme views,’ as well as
‘openly libertarian students,’ whom she ‘suspect[s] are more
likely to own guns given their distaste for government.’”84
The Fifth Circuit held that Glass lacked standing to
bring her First Amendment claim because she failed to prove
that the alleged harm was “certainly impending.” The court
explained that “Glass cannot manufacture standing by selfcensoring her speech based on what she alleges to be a
reasonable probability that concealed-carry license holders will
intimidate professors and students in the classroom.”85
In support of her Second Amendment claim, Glass
argued that “the Campus Carry Law and University policy
violate the Second Amendment because firearm usage in her
presence is not sufficiently ‘well regulated.’”86 “Glass contends
that to the extent the Second Amendment recognizes an
individual right to carry firearms, persons not carrying arms
have a right to the practice being well-regulated.”87 “‘Like it or
not,’ Glass argues, ‘there is specific constitutional language that
premises the right, whatever its extent, on the use of guns [as]
‘well-regulated.’ ’ She argues that the prefatory clause places a
‘condition’ on the individual right.”88
To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit found that Heller
precludes such an interpretation:
Glass’s argument is foreclosed by Heller. In two
separate locations in the majority opinion, the
Court held that the Second Amendment’s
prefatory clause does not limit its operative
clause: “The [prefatory clause] does not limit the
[operative clause] grammatically, but rather
announces a purpose.” 554 U.S. at 577, 128 S.Ct.
2783.
Indeed, the “prefatory clause does not limit or
expand the scope of the operative clause.” Id. at
578, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Amendment’s first
clause“ is prefatory and not a limitation on the
Id. at 238 (brackets in original).
Id. at 242.
86 Id. at 243.
87 Id. at 244.
88 Id.
84
85
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amendment itself.” Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436,
444 (5th Cir. 2016). Because the operative clause
provides the codification of the individual right,
the prefatory clause cannot “limit or expand the
scope” of the individual right. Heller, 554 U.S. at
578, 128 S.Ct. 2783.89
“The prefatory clause does not limit the scope of the
individual right codified in the operative clause” so Glass
“failed to state a claim under the Second Amendment.”90
In support of her Equal Protection claim, Glass argued
that “the Campus Carry Law and University policy violate her
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
because the University lacks a rational basis for determining
where students can or cannot concealed-carry handguns on
campus.”91
In her amended complaint, Glass alleges that
“[t]here is no rational basis for the division in the
state’s policies between where concealed carry
of handguns is permitted and where it may be
prohibited.” She does not challenge Texas’s
purported government interest: public safety
and self-defense. Instead, she argues that there is
no rational basis for Texas to allow private
universities to ban concealed carry but not
public universities. In addition, she argues that
there is no rational basis for the University to
allow concealed carry in classrooms while
simultaneously prohibiting the practice in other
campus locations such as faculty offices,
research laboratories, and residence halls.92
Texas provided a rational response to each allegation. “First, the
Campus Carry Law distinguishes between public and private
universities in order to respect the property rights of private
universities. Second, public safety and self-defense cannot be
achieved if concealed carry is banned in classrooms because
Id.
Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 245.
89
90
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attending class is a core reason for students to travel to
campus.”93 And third, “public safety and self-defense can still
be achieved if concealed carry is banned in less-frequented
areas such as faculty offices and research laboratories.”94
Since “Texas’s rationales are arguable at the very least,”
Glass’s Equal Protection claim failed.95

VI. SIXTH CIRCUIT

A. UPHOLDING GUN BAN FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
MISDEMEANOR IN DISTANT PAST. STIMMEL V. SESSIONS
Terry Lee Stimmel pleaded no contest in 1997 to
“knowingly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm to
a family or household member,” a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence.96 In 2002, he tried to purchase a firearm from
Walmart but was denied as a domestic violence misdemeanant.
After unsuccessfully appealing to the FBI, he challenged the
constitutionality of the federal ban on domestic violence
misdemeanants codified in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The Sixth
Circuit, like every other Circuit Court to consider a Second
Amendment challenge to the ban so far, upheld the law.97
The court applied the Two-Part Test. In determining
whether the law burdened the scope of the right, the court
sought evidence of historical or longstanding regulations on
domestic violence misdemeanants. After failing to find such
evidence, the court assumed without deciding “that a domestic
violence misdemeanant’s Second Amendment rights remain
intact to some degree” and continued to Part Two.98
The court applied intermediate scrutiny in Part Two
primarily because “Stimmel, as a domestic violence
misdemeanant, is at least somewhat removed from the

Id.
Id.
95 Id. at 246.
96 Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A).
97 Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198 (6th Cir. 2018); See Kopel &
Greenlee, supra note 1, at 242–44, 278–81, 305–06 (discussing cases
from other circuits).
98 Stimmel, 879 F.3d at 205.
93
94
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Amendment’s core protected class as defined in Heller.”99 And
because “Congress lightened the burden on the right by
providing domestic violence misdemeanants with four
mechanisms of relief from their firearm disability. They can (1)
petition to set aside their conviction; (2) seek a pardon; (3) have
their conviction expunged; or (4) have their civil rights fully
restored.”100 “In sum, § 922(g)(9) places a substantial burden on
the right, but does not touch the Second Amendment’s core—
intermediate scrutiny is appropriate here.”101
The court emphasized that “[t]he burden of justifying §
922(g)(9) under heightened scrutiny is demanding and remains
with the government.”102 The government satisfied this burden
by proving that a “reasonable fit” exists between disarming
domestic violence misdemeanants and its compelling objective
of preventing gun violence:
On the government’s evidence, which Stimmel
fails to rebut, it is reasonable to conclude that
domestic abusers have high recidivism rates,
pose a continued risk to their families, as well as
law enforcement, are more likely to kill their
victims when armed, and should therefore be
disarmed. In accord with the unanimous view of
those circuits that have addressed the question,
we conclude the fit here is, at least, reasonable.
Section § 922(g)(9) survives intermediate
scrutiny.103
The evidence that domestic violence offenders in
general are much more likely than the general population to
perpetrate criminal homicides or other major violent crimes is
overwhelming. However, the evidence that one-time offenders
remain dangerous even after decades of good behavior is thin.
Accordingly, Judge Danny Boggs dissented. As he
summarized:

Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 211.
99

100
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Because the government has offered, at best,
minimal evidence that a non-recidivist domestic
violence misdemeanant presents a heightened
risk of reoffending decades after his or her
conviction, it has yet to justify what is,
effectively, a lifetime ban on a fundamental
constitutional right.104
In a 2016 statutory interpretation case on the federal
domestic violence statute, Justice Thomas’s dissent also raised
concerns about the prohibition, which is the only federal statute
that uses a misdemeanor conviction to impose a lifetime ban on
the exercise of a constitutional right. He criticized the majority
for treating the Second Amendment as a second-class right.105

B. NO RIGHT TO SELL GUNS TO FELONS. UNITED STATES V.
BACON
Donte Bacon admitted that he “purchased the firearm”
and “sold it ... with reasonable cause to know that [the
purchaser was] a felon” in August of 2014.106 Later that month,
“Bacon confirmed that he sold a different firearm, a
semiautomatic pistol with an obliterated serial number, to a
prohibited person.”107 Bacon was convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) and (k) for selling a firearm to a prohibited
person and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial
number. He appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit seemingly placed the burden on Bacon
to prove that the Second Amendment protects the right to sell
arms to felons: “Bacon has not provided and we are unable to
find any historical indication that the Second Amendment
encompasses such sales.”108 This was erroneous. Under the
Id. at 213 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
Voisine v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2272, 2291 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s reading that the statute
encompasses reckless conduct); See David Kopel, Voisine v. United
States - Post-Decision SCOTUScast, FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Aug. 8, 2016)
(audio),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/podcasts/voisine-vunited-states-post-decision-scotuscast.
106 United States v. Bacon, 884 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2018) (brackets in
original).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 611.
104
105
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precedent of the Sixth Circuit, and of other circuits, the
government bears the Part One burden of proof to show that a
particular activity is outside the scope of the Second
Amendment right as traditionally understood.109
However, since there was Supreme Court precedent
nearly on point, the court’s error was mostly a matter of
semantics. Heller had stated: “nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons.”110 The prohibition on selling
firearms to felons is thus easy to infer.
The Sixth Circuit determined that Bacon asserted a
Second Amendment challenge only to the ban on selling
firearms to felons. As for the separate ban on selling firearms
with obliterated serial numbers, the court explained in a
footnote that “[e]ven if he had raised Second Amendment
arguments regarding § 922(k), we are persuaded by the Third
Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 100
(3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a defendant’s Second Amendment
challenge and finding that ‘§ 922(k) would pass muster under
either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny’).”111

VII. EIGHTH CIRCUIT
A. SUPPRESSORS

AND SHORT-BARRELED RIFLES ARE NOT

INDISPUTABLY PART OF SECOND
UNITED STATES V. STEPP-ZAFFT

AMENDMENT

RIGHT.

After a search of Stepp-Zafft’s apartment produced
“numerous firearms [including five unregistered shortbarreled rifles], grenade bodies, fuses, black powder, empty
carbon dioxide pellet gun cylinders, and what appeared to be

See United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2011)); see also
Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir.
2014); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681–82 (4th Cir. 2010).
110 Bacon, 884 F.3d at 611–12 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27).
111 Id. at 612 n.3; See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 1, at 204–05, 212–14,
216, 236–37 (discussing the persuasive and well-reasoned Marzzarella
opinion, which is a foundation of circuit jurisprudence on the Second
Amendment).
109
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two homemade silencers fashioned out of oil and fuel filters,”112
Stepp-Zafft was convicted of possessing unregistered
firearms—specifically, five short-barreled rifles, nine
destructive devices, and two suppressors—in violation of 26
U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871. Those statutes, part of the National
Firearms Act of 1934 (“NFA”), as amended, require possessors
or manufacturers of such items to register those items and pay
a tax. Stepp-Zafft had done neither.
“On appeal, Stepp-Zafft contends that the registration
requirement unconstitutionally infringes on a Second
Amendment right to possess the short-barreled rifles and
homemade silencers found in his apartment.” However,
because Stepp-Zafft raised these issues for the first time on
appeal, the court reviewed only for plain error.113
Regarding the defendant’s untimely argument that
short-barreled rifles (SBRs) are protected arms: “Heller said that
there is no Second Amendment right to possess a short-barreled
shotgun . . . and a plurality of the Court previously observed in
a different context that a short-barreled rifle is a ‘concealable
weapon’ that is ‘likely to be used for criminal
purposes.’”114 Moreover, “[o]ther courts have seen no
United States v. Stepp-Zafft, 733 F. App’x 327, 328 (8th Cir. 2018)
(brackets added). “At trial, agents described the items seized from
Stepp-Zafft’s apartment. All five of the unregistered short-barreled
rifles had been modified from their original design. Two had been
modified with barrels shorter than sixteen inches. The other three
were originally designed and sold as pistols, but they had been
converted into short-barreled rifles with the addition of a shoulder
stock.” Id.
113 Typically, a party must show “good cause” to raise a defect in an
indictment for the first time at the appellate stage, but the government
failed to present that argument so such a showing was not required in
this case. Id.
114 Id. at 328 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 624; United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517 (1992)).
Thompson/Center Arms had held that ATF may not impose the $200
National Firearms Act (NFA) tax for the sale of kits that could be
assembled into any of the following: 1. Legal single-shot rifle (long
barrel plus stock), 2. Legal single-shot handgun (short barrel, no
stock), or 3. NFA-covered short-barreled rifle (stock, short barrel).
Thompson/Center was a split decision. Justice Souter announced the
judgment of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor. Interpreting the NFA statute, they stated that by selling
items that could be combined in various ways (one of which would
112
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constitutional distinction between short-barreled shotguns and
rifles in the wake of Heller.”115 Therefore “Stepp-Zafft’s
constitutional claim is at least subject to reasonable dispute [so
the] district court did not make an obvious error by failing to
dismiss the charge sua sponte.”116
As for whether suppressors are protected arms, the
Eighth Circuit noted that “some courts after Heller have rejected
his position on the ground that silencers are not typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”117 And
“because he did not raise this challenge in the district court, the
parties did not present evidence on the purposes and common
uses of silencers.” Therefore, “the claim is at least subject to
reasonable dispute in light of existing authorities and the
undeveloped record in this case,” so the “district court did not
commit a plain error by declining to dismiss the charge on its
own motion.”118
The Stepp-Zafft decision is correct as far as it goes, since
the district court was not on notice that registration
requirements for SBRs and suppressors are plainly
unconstitutional. However, it would be sloppy reasoning to
assume that everything in the NFA is outside of the Second
Amendment simply because Heller suggested that shortbarreled shotguns and machine guns are outside.

require NFA registration), Thompson/Center had not “made” a NFA
item. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
judgment. They reasoned that, under the statutory provisions at issue,
the making of a firearm could not be completed until the firearm is
assembled. Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Kennedy. They relied on legislative history and rejected
application of the rule of lenity in a civil case. Thompson/Center was
selling all the parts necessary to make a short-barreled rifle; the fact
that other parts were included in the sale was irrelevant. Justice
Stevens also dissented separately, emphasizing the danger of
concealable firearms.
115 Id. at 328 (citing United States v. Gilbert, 286 Fed. App’x 383, 386
(9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cox, 235 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1227 (D.
Kan. 2017); United States v. Gonzales, No. 2:10-cr-00967, 2011 WL
5288727, at *6 (D. Utah Nov. 2, 2011)).
116 Stepp-Zafft, 733 Fed. App’x at 328.
117 Id. (citing United States v. McCartney, 357 Fed. App’x 73, 76 (9th
Cir. 2009); Cox, 235 F.Supp.3d at 1227; United States v. Perkins, No.
4:08CR3064, 2008 WL 4372821, at *4 (D. Neb. Sept. 23, 2008)).
118 Stepp-Zafft, supra note 112, at *2.
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For example, a student note in the Harvard Journal of Law
& Public Policy argues that there is no good reason for regulating
SBRs more stringently than other firearms. The note also casts
doubt on ATF’s administrative interpretations expending the
scope of the SBR statute, such as by attempting to control arm
braces or forward grips for pistols.119
Notably, a SBR is less lethal than a rifle with a longer
barrel, due to reduced velocity and hence reduced kinetic
energy. In contrast, short-barreled shotguns can be more lethal
at close range, in the sense that the shorter barrel produces a
wider shot spread. Whatever the reason, short-barreled
shotguns have always been disproportionately used in crime,
whereas SBRs are not.
An article by Stephen Halbrook examined the legislative
history of the NFA and found no support for treating
“silencers” as NFA items. As Halbrook pointed out, sound
moderators are standard equipment for hunting rifles in several
European nations; there, the permit or license for rifle
possession generally presumes that the user will (or must) use
a sound moderator.120

VIII. NINTH CIRCUIT
A. AFFIRMING INJUNCTION AGAINST CALIFORNIA
MAGAZINE CONFISCATION. DUNCAN V. BECERRA
In Duncan v. Becerra,121 the Ninth Circuit issued an
unpublished opinion upholding a preliminary injunction
enjoining California from enforcing a statute that required
persons who lawfully possess “large-capacity magazines”
(supposedly, magazines capable of holding more than 10
rounds) to dispossess them. Citizens were provided three
options for dispossession: they could (1) “remove the largecapacity magazine from the State;” (2) “sell the large-capacity
See James A. D’Cruz, Half-Cocked: The Regulatory Framework of ShortBarrel Firearms, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 493 (2017).
120 Stephen P. Halbrook, Firearm Sound Moderators: Issues of
Criminalization and the Second Amendment, 46 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 33
(2015-2016). See generally, Allen Halbrook, The NFA Creates Some
Particular Dangers for Non-Licensees Making or Modifying AR-Type Rifles
and for Those Making Silencers, State Bar of Texas, 6th Annual 2017
TXCLE Firearms Law symposium 7.VII.
121 Duncan v. Becerra, 742 F. App’x 218 (9th Cir. 2018).
119
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magazine to a licensed firearm dealer;” or (3) “surrender the
large-capacity magazine to a law enforcement agency for
destruction.”122
The district court held that the ban violates the Second
Amendment—both under intermediate scrutiny and under
what it called “the Heller test,”123 which simply “asks whether
the law bans types of firearms commonly used for a lawful
purpose.”124
As the district court found, the magazines are
commonly owned by law-abiding citizens for self-defense. The
court noted that some of the nation’s most popular handguns—
which Heller deemed the “quintessential self-defense
weapon”—come with standard magazines larger than 10
rounds. The court also found that such magazines would very
likely be utilized by a present-day militia and would contribute
to the common defense. Thus, the court found that the
magazines are protected by the Second Amendment.
The district court held that the ban failed intermediate
scrutiny as well. The court deemed the magazine ban “a
haphazard solution likely to have no effect on an exceedingly
rare problem, while at the same time burdening the
constitutional rights of other California law-abiding
responsible citizen[s].”125 Although California had offered
evidence from Michael Bloomberg organizations and similar
groups claiming that “large” magazines make mass shootings
worse, the district court carefully reviewed the evidence and
found it shoddy and unpersuasive.
Further, “it would be reasonable to infer, based on the
State’s evidence, that a right to possess magazines that hold
more than 10 rounds may promote self-defense,” meaning that
the evidence showed public safety might actually be better
served by increasing the availability of the banned magazines.126
Thus, the “reasonable fit” between the challenged regulation
and an important state interest did not exist, so the ban failed
intermediate scrutiny.
Cal. Penal Code § 32310(d)(1)-(3).
Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1117–18 (S.D. Cal. 2017).
124 Id. at 1117 (quoting Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S.Ct. 447,
449 (2015) (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari)).
125 Id. at 1124.
126 Id. at 1121.
122
123
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Federal appellate courts review district court
preliminary injunctions only for abuse of discretion. By a 2-1
vote, the panel found there had been no abuse of discretion.
First, the district court was correct that “magazines for a
weapon likely fall within the scope of the Second
Amendment.”127 Second, “[a]lthough the district court applied
two different tests, there is no reversible error if one of those
tests follows the applicable legal principles and the district
court ultimately reaches the same conclusion in both
analyses.”128 The appropriate test under circuit precedent was
intermediate scrutiny.
Finally, “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion
by concluding that [the law] did not pass intermediate scrutiny.
The district court’s review of the evidence included numerous
judgment calls regarding the quality, type, and reliability of the
evidence, as well as repeated credibility determinations.”129 On
appeal, “California articulates no actual error made by the
district court, but, rather, multiple instances where it disagrees
with the district court's conclusion or analysis regarding certain
pieces of evidence. This is insufficient to establish that the
district court's findings of fact and its application of the legal
standard to those facts were ‘illogical, implausible, or without
support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the
record.’”130
In a 2015 case, a different three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit had upheld a district court’s decision not to grant a
preliminary injunction against a similar confiscation law
enacted by a Bay Area town, Sunnyvale.131 Although the
evidence in the Fyock v. Sunnyvale and Duncan cases differered,
the key point was that neither decision by the district judges in
those cases was an abuse of discretion. Rather, the decision to
grant or not grant the preliminary injunction was based on the
district judges’ reasonable discretion in weighing the evidence
before them. When a preliminary injunction is being appealed,
the only job for the appellate judges is to see if there is an abuse
of discretion; the appellate judges are not supposed to reweigh
the evidence. The fact that two district court judges saw similar
Duncan, 742 F. App’x at 220.
Id. at 220.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 222. (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251
(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
131 Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2015).
127
128
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evidence and came to different conclusions does not mean that
either judge is guilty of abuse of discretion.
The majority wrote that Judge Wallace’s dissent was
improperly reweighing the evidence. For example, Judge
Wallace wrote that the confiscation law could be upheld based
on some statistics supplied by one of Michael Bloomberg’s
organizations. Yet the district court had specifically explained
why those statistics lacked reliability and credibility: they were
“incomplete studies from unreliable sources upon which
experts base speculative explanation and predictions.”132
Like the Second Circuit in another magazine ban case,133
Judge Wallace seemed to favor a very weak standard of
intermediate scrutiny review for Second Amendment cases: as
long as the government could provide some evidence, that was
sufficient—notwithstanding the other side’s evidence showing
that the government evidence is flawed or unpersuasive.

B. FOR COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA
ISLANDS, DISTRICT COURT DECISION AGAINST HANDGUN
BAN MAY NOT BE APPEALED BY WOULD-BE INTERVENOR.
RADICH V. GUERRERO
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
(CNMI) is a United States Territory in the northern Pacific
Ocean. The southernmost island in the Mariana Archipelago is
Guam, although Guam is a separate territory.134 Most
inhabitants of the CNMI live on the islands of Saipan, Tinian,
and Rota.
In 2016, a decision of the federal district court for the
District of the Northern Mariana Islands held certain gun
Duncan, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1120.
New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242
(2d Cir. 2015); Kopel & Greenlee, at 288–97 (discussing Second
Circuit’s uniquely weak standard of review).
134 Guam became part of the United States when it was seized from
Spain in 1898 in the Spanish-American War. In 1899, Spain sold the
rest of the Mariana Archipelago to Germany. Japan seized the
archipelago from Germany in World War I. After World War II, the
United Nations declared the archipelago (not including Guam) to be
a United Nations Trust Territory to be administered by the United
States. Pursuant to a vote of Congress and of the Mariana people, the
territory became an associated commonwealth of the United States,
with a constitution adopted in 1978.
132
133

FEDERAL CIRCUIT SECOND AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS 2018

113

controls in the CNMI to be contrary to the Second
Amendment.135 The district court began by pointing out that the
Covenant establishing the Commonwealth expressly made the
Second and Fourteenth Amendments applicable to the
CNMI.136
The district court found the following unconstitutional:
•
•
•
•

A law prohibiting lawful permanent CNMI
residents who were not of native blood from being
issued gun permits.
A ban on issuing gun permits for home defense.
A handgun possession ban.
A handgun import ban. 137

The Commonwealth’s legislature promptly enacted a
new gun control statute that complied with the district court’s
decision. The Commonwealth elected not to appeal the district
court decision to the Ninth Circuit.138 During the period for
filing an appeal, the Tanapag Middle School Parent Teacher
Student Association (PTSA) attempted to intervene in the case
and file an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The district court
rejected the motion to intervene.139
In July 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s denial of the motion to intervene because the PTSA
lacked standing.140 Even if the PTSA were correct that the Radich
decision would lead to metal detectors being installed in
schools, PTSA is a voluntary organization, and the Radich
decision did not require PTSA “to do or refrain from doing
anything.”141
PTSA also claimed organizational standing because
some members are teachers and teachers have a duty to protect
students. However, organizational standing must be “germane
See generally Radich v. Guerrero, No. 1:14-CV-00020, 2016 WL
1212437 (D.N. Mar. I. Mar. 28, 2016).
136 Id. at 2.
137 Id. at 9.
138 The Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction includes Guam and the CNMI. The
CNMI legislature later enacted a handgun ban that would go into
effect only if the district court decision were overturned.
139 Radich v. Guerrero, 1:14-CV-00020, 2016 WL 3034159 (D.N. Mar. I.
May 27, 2016).
140 Radich v. Guerrero, 729 Fed. App’x 623 (9th Cir. 2018).
141 Id. at 624 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013)).
135
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to the organization’s purpose.” Article III standing is not
conferred merely by “a desire to vindicate value interests.”

C. OPEN CARRY IS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT AND MAY NOT BE
LIMITED ONLY TO SECURITY GUARDS. YOUNG V. HAWAII
In Peruta v. San Diego, the en banc Ninth Circuit held that
the Second Amendment does not protect the concealed carrying
of handguns; addressing the issue that Peruta had carefully
avoided, in July 2018, a 2-1 panel in Young v. Hawaii held that
Hawaii's near-total prohibition on the open carrying of
handguns for lawful self-defense violates the right to bear
arms.142
Hawaii's restrictions on firearms carry are the most
extreme of any state. Carrying or transporting a loaded firearm
outside of one’s property is generally forbidden. Unloaded and
cased firearms may be transported while going to or from a
gunsmith, a hunting ground, and a few other places. Carrying
a loaded handgun in public, either openly or concealed,
requires a permit. Concealed carry permits are close to nil (4
permits have been issued in the last 18 years). Only a few dozen
open carry permits exist in the State, and they are only for
security guards while on the job.
After being denied a permit, George K. Young, Jr.
brought a lawsuit in the federal district court for the district of
Hawaii.143 The district court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, and Young appealed. For procedural reasons, the State
of Hawaii was out of the case by the appellate stage, but the
County of Hawaii (the Big Island) remained as a defendant. The
State nevertheless filed an amicus brief.
The Ninth Circuit panel examined Heller and McDonald
v. City of Chicago, which had explicated that the textual right to
“keep” arms is distinct from the right to “bear” arms. The latter
includes the right to bear arms for self-defense outside the
home, but (as Heller said and McDonald reaffirmed), the exercise
of the right may be excluded from “sensitive places, such as
schools and government buildings.”144 In Young, “The State’s
Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018).
143 Young v. Hawaii, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D. Haw. 2012).
144 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
786 (2010).
142
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amicus brief asks us to stretch this list of presumptively lawful
measures to allow all laws ‘preserving public safety.’ This
argument borders on the absurd. Surely not all areas of the
public are as sensitive as schools or government buildings, nor
is it, as the State suggests, a ‘very small and reasonable step to
view virtually the entire public sphere as a sensitive place.’”145
Expressly following the methodology of Heller and
McDonald, the Young court carefully examined history and
tradition. Early sources, such as Blackstone, considered the
right to bear arms for self-defense to be a natural right; so did
the first American treatise on constitutional law, St. George
Tucker’s 1803 annotated American edition of Blackstone. Like
Heller, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Tucker:
And in advocating for the prerogative of the
Judiciary to strike down unconstitutional
statutes, Tucker wrote: “If, for example, congress
were to pass a law prohibiting any person from
bearing arms, as a means of preventing
insurrections, the judicial courts, . . . would be
able to pronounce decidedly upon the
constitutionality of these means.” see also
Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second
Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial
Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for SelfDefense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 637–38 (2012).146
Following the Heller methodology, the Ninth Circuit
studied nineteenth-century cases on the right to arms,
especially cases from before the Civil War. The majority of the
cases—including the cases that Heller said were correct
explications of the right—upheld prohibitions on concealed
carry, but rejected similar restrictions on open carry.
During the nineteenth century, the South was the region
most enthusiastic about gun control, and some Southern
controls were based on racial animus.
Young, 896 F.3d at 1053 n.6.
Id. at 1054. Also included in the natural rights discussion were
Leonard W. Levy’s Origins of the Bill of Rights (quoting a prominent
colonial newspaper on the right to arms as “a natural right”) and
David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller's Lesson for the
World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235 (2008).
145
146
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The dissent faults our reliance on decisions from
the South, implying that the thorough analysis
found in such opinions must have been the
product of a “culture where slavery, honor,
violence, and the public carrying of weapons
were intertwined.”... To say the least, we are
puzzled. The dissent overlooks the fact that the
Southern cases on which we rely only arose
because the legislatures in those states had
enacted restrictions on the public carry of
firearms. Indeed, were it the case that the
Southern culture of slavery animated concerns
to protect the right to open carry, why would the
Georgia legislature have sought to ban open
carry in the first place?
As a more fundamental matter, too, we cannot
agree with the dissent’s choice to cast aside
Southern cases. Heller placed great emphasis on
cases from the South, and Nunn in particular. We
are an inferior court. Can we really, while
keeping a straight face, now say that such cases
have little persuasive effect in analyzing the
contours of the Second Amendment? We think
not.147
As the Young majority acknowledged, a minority of the
nineteenth-century cases denied that there is right to defensive
carry; these cases start with Arkansas’s 1842 State v. Buzzard.148
These cases are explicitly based on the assumption that the right
to keep and bear arms is solely to foster the militia.

Young, 896 F.3d at 1057 n.9. Nunn was an 1846 Georgia case striking
a ban on most handguns, striking a ban on open carry, and upholding
a ban on concealed carry. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846). Heller quotes
and lauds Nunn more than any other case. The article that the Young
dissent relied on is Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism
and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125
YALE L.J. FORUM 121 (2015). Cornell is a prolific and sometimes
unreliable historian. See David T. Hardy, Lawyers, Historians and ‘Law
Office History’, 46 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 1 (2015).
148 State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
147
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Yet, with Heller on the books, cases in Buzzard’s
flock furnish us with little instructive value.
That’s because Heller made clear that the Second
Amendment is, and always has been, an
individual right centered on self-defense; it has
never been a right only to be exercised in
connection with a militia....And bound as the
inferior court that we are, we may only assess
whether the right to bear arms extends outside
the home on the understanding that the right is
an individual one centered on self-defense.
Thus, Heller knocks out the load-bearing bricks
in the foundation of cases like Buzzard, for those
courts only approved broad limitations on the
public carry of weapons because such
limitations in no way detracted from the
common defense of the state.149
An 1830s Massachusetts statute provided a model
adopted by several other states. According to the statute, if
Person A provided well-founded evidence to a court that
Person B threatened “injury or a breach of the peace,” then the
court could issue an order presenting Person B with two
choices: (1) Stop carrying arms in public or (2) If you want to
continue carrying arms, then you must post a bond for good
behavior (“surety of the peace”). Despite the court order,
Person B could continue carrying arms, without need for
posting a bond, under two circumstances: (1) militia service or
(2) if Person B had “good cause” to fear for his safety.
Professor Saul Cornell and the Young dissent
characterize these statutes as broad bans on public carrying.
This is contrary to the text. The statutes applied only to persons
who were identified in court by specific evidence as being
particularly dangerous. Even then, they could still carry if they
posted a bond.
In 1328, English King Edward II created the Statute of
Northampton, which forbade subjects “to go nor ride armed by
night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the
Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere.” There was
an exception for the king’s servants. It is possible to read the
statute as a comprehensive ban on carry. The dissent relied on
149

Young, 896 F.3d at 1057–58.
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the argument of scholar Patrick J. Charles, who contends that
the Statute of Northampton was part of the common law and
was adopted in America, and therefore, there is no right to carry
arms.150
However, the Statute of Northampton was not
interpreted in England as a carry ban—at least not by the time
the American colonies were on the scene. William Hawkins's
1716 treatise explained that “no wearing of Arms is within the
meaning of this Statute, unless it be accompanied with such
Circumstances as are apt to terrify the People.”151
Hawkins’s view is consistent with the result of a famous
trial from 1686, Sir John Knight’s Case. The Chief Justice of the
King’s Bench explained that the Statute of Northampton applies
only to “people who go armed to terrify the King’s subjects.”152
“More fundamentally,” wrote the Young majority, “we
respectfully decline the County’s and the State’s invitation to
import English law wholesale into our Second Amendment
jurisprudence....Indeed, there is a scholarly consensus that the
1689 English right to have arms was less protective than its
American counterpart.”153
Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment outside the
Home, Take Two: How We Got Here and Why It Matters, 64 CLEVELAND
STATE L. REV. 373 (2016).
151 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 489 (8th
ed., 1824). Hawkins is the main source for Heller’s statement that
“dangerous and unusual” weapons are not within the protection of
the right to arms. Although Hawkins was writing about carrying
“dangerous and unusual” arms, the Heller majority expanded
Hawkins’s point to cover the possession of “dangerous and unusual”
arms.
152 Knight, who was a political opponent of King James II, had carried
a blunderbuss to church because some Irish Catholics had made
credible threats to assassinate him. King James II was pro-Catholic,
while Knight was an enthusiast for persecution of Catholics. As one
observer of the trial recounted, the jury acquitted Knight “not thinking
he did it with any ill design.” For more on the Statute of Northampton
and Knight's Case see NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, DAVID B. KOPEL, GEORGE
A. MOCSARY & MICHAEL P. O’SHEA, FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND
AMENDMENT 91–101 (2d ed. 2017).
153 Young, 896 F.3d at 1065. For example, as St. George Tucker noted,
English law defined as “treason” any gathering of a certain number of
armed men without prior government approval, but such gatherings
were a protected right under the American Constitution. See id.
(quoting St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of
150
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Early American commentators interpreted common law
limits on arms carrying as applying only to persons who carried
“offensively” or in a “terrifying” manner or who carried
“dangerous and unusual” weapons. The 1843 North Carolina
State v. Huntly explained “the carrying of a gun per se
constitutes no offence. For any lawful purpose—either of
business or amusement—the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry
his gun. It is the wicked purpose—and the mischievous result—
which essentially constitute the crime.”154
Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the
United States, vol. 5, app., n.B, at 19).
154 25 N.C. 418, 422–23 (1843). The phrase “business or amusement”
was a legal term of art, to encompass all peaceable activity. See, e.g.,
The Schooner Exchange v. Mcfaddon & Others, 11 U.S. 116 (1812)
(Marshall, C.J.) (“[T]he ports of a nation are open to the private and
public ships of a friendly power, whose subjects have also liberty
without special license, to enter the country for business or
amusement. . . .”); Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, No. 741 (Cir.
Ct. E.D. Penn. 1833) (Supreme Court Justice Baldwin, acting as Circuit
Judge) (“[A]ny traveller who comes into Pennsylvania upon a
temporary excursion for business or amusement”); Baxter v. Taber, 4
Mass. 361, 367 (1808) (“[H]e may live with his family, and pursue his
business, or amusements, at his pleasure, either on land or water. . .
.”); Respublica v. Richards, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 224 (Penn. 1795) (same
language as Johnson v. Tompkins).
According to Cornell, Charles, and the Young dissent, all carrying
(except when mandated by the government) was considered
inherently “terrifying.” The majority answers:
What an odd way it would be to write a criminal
statute!....For instance, Maine’s 1821 Northampton
analogue authorized the arrest of “all affrayers,
rioters, disturbers or breakers of the peace, and such
as shall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear or
terror of the good citizens of this State, or such others
as may utter any menaces or threatening speeches.”
1821 Me. Laws 285. If riding armed were itself
unlawful because it terrorized the good citizens of
Maine, it strains credulity to suggest that Maine
drafters would have felt the need to clarify such
reasoning right in the middle of the statute's
operative provisions. Indeed, why only clarify the
consequences of riding armed, and no other
prohibited conduct?
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In all, “whatever Northampton banned on the shores of
England,” the American right to carry common weapons
openly for self-defense “was not hemmed in by longstanding
bans on carrying.”155
Because text, history, and tradition show that peaceful
carrying of common arms is part of the Second Amendment,
the next question was the standard of judicial review. Bearing
arms is part of the core of the Second Amendment. “While the
Amendment’s guarantee of a right to ‘keep’ arms effectuates the
core purpose of self-defense within the home, the separate right
to ‘bear’ arms protects that core purpose outside the home.”156
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, “We next ask whether
section 134-9 [Hawaii statute that specifies open carry permits
may be issued only to security professionals] ‘amounts to a
destruction’ of the core Second Amendment right to carry a
firearm openly for self-defense….If so, the law is
‘unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.’”157
As counsel for Hawaii County had admitted at oral
argument, “no one other than a security guard—or someone
similarly employed—had ever been issued an open carry
license.” Thus:
Restrictions challenged under the Second
Amendment must be analyzed with regard to
their effect on the typical, law-abiding
citizen....An individual right that does not apply
to the ordinary citizen would be a contradiction
Young, 896 F.3d at 1067. The “odd” Cornell-Charles reading
of early American state statutes would conflict with “neighboring
criminal provisions.” For example, Delaware allowed a slave to “go
armed with any dangerous weapon” if the master gave permission.
Yet by the Cornell et al. theory, nobody in Delaware could carry any
weapon, except when mandated by government. Id.
Likewise, Tennessee authorized sheriffs to arrest anyone
“armed with the intention of committing a riot or affray.” But
according to Cornell, carrying an arm at all was a serious crime. So
why limit arrest powers only to “riot and affray”? “Why on earth
would Tennessee have so limited a sheriff’s authorization to arrest if
going armed was itself unlawful?” Id.
155 Id. at 1067–68 (quoting Wrenn v. D.C., 864 F.3d 650, 660–61 (D.C.
Cir. 2017)).
156 Id. at 1069.
157 Id. at 1070.
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in terms....Just as the Second Amendment does
not protect a right to bear arms only in
connection with a militia, it surely does not
protect a right to bear arms only as a security
guard. The typical, law-abiding citizen in the
State of Hawaii is therefore entirely foreclosed
from exercising the core Second Amendment
right to bear arms for self-defense. It follows that
section 134-9 “amounts to a destruction” of a
core right, and as such, it is infirm “[u]nder any
of the standards of scrutiny.”158
The Hawaii portion of the statute limiting open carry to
security professionals was held unconstitutional. The decision
below was reversed and remanded. Notably, the plaintiffs did
not challenge a separate requirement in Hawaii: that carry
permits be issued only “Where the urgency or the need has been
sufficiently indicated.” With no information in the record
“showing the stringency of the requirement,” the court did not
address “whether such requirement violates the Second
Amendment.”159
In 2019, the Ninth Circuit granted Hawaii County’s
petition of en banc rehearing. As this Article goes to press, oral
argument has not yet been held.

D. STATE
CARRY

MAY EXEMPT RETIRED PEACE OFFICERS FROM
BAN NEAR SCHOOLS WITHOUT EXEMPTING

CONCEALED-CARRY

BECERRA

PERMITHOLDERS,

GALLINGER

V.

California passed the Gun-Free School Zone Act in 1994,
which banned firearms from school grounds and within school
zones (defined as a 1,000-foot radius around school grounds).
The statute provided two exceptions: concealed-carry
permitholders and retired peace officers.
Reacting against the trend in other states towards armed
defense of schools, California amended its Gun-Free School
Zone Act in 2015. The amendment as introduced would have
eliminated the exceptions for both permitholders and retired

158
159

Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1050 n.2.
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law enforcement, but as passed, the amendment retained the
exception for retired law enforcement.
A group of permitholders and firearms organizations
challenged the amendment, arguing that it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by
irrationally treating permitholders and retired law enforcement
differently.
Notably, the Ninth Circuit had held in Silveira v. Lockyer
that an exemption for retired officers from an “assault
weapons” ban violated the Equal Protection Clause.160 The
Gallinger court determined that Silveira was distinguishable “for
the commonsense reason that assault weapons are more
dangerous than other kinds of firearms.”161 The court explained
that “while the inherent risks that accompany carrying assault
weapons for self-defense or public-safety purposes may
outweigh any increased benefits to a retired officer's or the
public's safety, the same need not be true for other kinds of
firearms.”162
After evading Silveira’s precedent, the Gallinger court
upheld the law based on the legislature’s determination that
“(1) retired peace officers are at a heightened risk of danger
based on their previous exposure to crime, and (2) allowing
them to carry firearms other than assault weapons on school
grounds mitigates that risk and increases officer safety.”163
The Ninth Circuit was also persuaded that retired
officers carrying firearms enhanced public safety “due to the
extensive training in the safe storage and operation of firearms
that law enforcement personnel receive.”164 It is unclear how
training in the safe storage of firearms improves one’s ability to
carry a firearm responsibly. And it is not necessarily true that a
retired officer is better trained than a permitholder; licensing
authorities in California may require permitholders to complete
a 24-hour course certified by the Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training in addition to 16 hours of standard
training.165

Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
Gallinger v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2018).
162 Id. at 1019.
163 Id. at 1020.
164 Id.
165 Cal. Penal Code § 26165.
160
161
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E. UPHOLDING

CHAMBER LOAD INDICATOR, MAGAZINE
DETACHMENT MECHANISM, AND MICROSTAMPING
REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW SEMIAUTOMATIC HANDGUNS:
PENA V. LINDLEY

A handgun must be included on the California
Department of Justice’s (“CDOJ”) handgun roster to be sold
commercially in the state. California often adds new
requirements for inclusion on the roster. The plaintiffs
challenged three requirements of semiautomatic handguns: (1)
that new models contain a chamber load indicator166 (“CLI,”
defined as a “device that plainly indicates that a cartridge is in
the firing chamber”);167 that each new model contain a
magazine detachment mechanism168 (“MDM,” defined as “a
mechanism that prevents a semiautomatic pistol that has a
detachable magazine from operating to strike the primer of
ammunition in the firing chamber when a detachable magazine
is not inserted in the semiautomatic pistol.”);169 and that each be
equipped with microstamping features (meaning that “each
such pistol must imprint two sets of microscopic arrays of
characters that identify the make, model, and serial number of
the pistol onto the cartridge or shell casing of each fired
round”).170 These requirements do not apply to handguns
already on the roster, which are grandfathered as long as the
manufacturer continuously pays a fee and the firearm does not
fail a retest for other requirements.171
Applying the Two-Part Test, the court assumed without
deciding that the laws burden the right to keep and bear arms,
and quickly proceeded to Part Two.
The court continued to move quickly in Part Two. The
court did not determine whether the laws implicate the core of
the Second Amendment right—even though under circuit
precedent the determination is a necessary inquiry in
determining the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny.172
Id. § 31910(b)(5).
Id. § 16380.
168 Id. § 31910(b)(5).
169 Id. § 16900.
170 Id. § 31910(b)(7).
171 Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 983 (9th Cir. 2018).
172 See U.S. v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (“the level of
scrutiny should depend on (1) how close the law comes to the core of
166
167
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Instead, the Pena court decided that intermediate scrutiny was
appropriate “[b]ecause the restrictions do not substantially
burden any such right.”173 The burden was unsubstantial
because the grandfathered firearms remained available174 and
because the laws “place almost no burden on the physical
exercise of Second Amendment rights.”175
For the mandatory magazine disconnect mechanism
(MDM), the court was unconcerned about semiautomatic
handguns being rendered useless without a magazine inserted:
“Although MDMs might prevent a gun from firing at will, it is
likely a rare occurrence when someone has time to put a round
from outside a magazine in the chamber without inserting the
magazine itself.”176 Therefore, “[t]he legislative judgment that
preventing cases of accidental discharge outweighs the need for
discharging a gun without the magazine in place is
reasonable.”177 This was pure speculation without evidence;
under standard rules of intermediate scrutiny, the government
cannot carry its burden of proof by speculating.178
The Ninth Circut’s application of intermediate scrutiny
for the second Amendment, was typically undemanding.
Because a chamber lock indicator (CLI) “lets someone know
that a gun is loaded without even having to pick it up to check”
and because a “MDM prevents a firearm from shooting unless
a magazine is inserted,” “[t]he CLI and MDM requirements
[]reasonably fit with California’s interest in public safety.”179
Whatever the merits of mandatory magazine
disconnects and chamber lock indicators, all parties agreed that
the Second Amendment right, and (2) the severity of the law's burden
on the right.”) (quotations omitted).
173 Pena, 898 F.3d at 977.
174 Id. at 978–79.
175 Id. at 978.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 980.
178 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (The
government’s “burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture.” Instead, it “must demonstrate that the harms it recites are
real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them.”).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (“We know of no other enumerated
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a
freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach. . . .
The Second
Amendment . . . is the very product of an interest balancing by the
people.”).
179 Id.
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they could be added to a firearm for a few extra dollars in
manufacturing costs. The double-microstamping mandate was
different. According to the plaintiffs, it was impossible at any
price. However, the Ninth Circuit upheld it; because doublemicrostamping requirement would theoretically “address the
substantial problem of untraceable bullets at crime scenes and
the value of a reasonable means of identification,” the court
held that the mandate reasonably fits with California’s interests
in public safety and crime prevention.180
The court was undeterred by “evidence that gun
manufacturers have not produced a functioning, commercially
available semiautomatic pistol equipped with the
microstamping technology and they have no plans to attempt
to do so.”181 The Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed the concern:
“[s]imply because no gun manufacturer is ‘even considering
trying’ to implement the technology, it does not follow that
microstamping is technologically infeasible.”182 “We need not
accept wholesale that manufacturers will decline to implement
this new public safety technology in the face of California’s
evidence that the technology is available and that compliance is
feasible.”183
California provided no evidence to contradict the
plaintiff’s claim that “no new handguns being sold in the
United States can satisfy CDOJ’s testing protocol and, therefore,
no new handguns qualify for California’s approved-as-safe
roster.”184 Significantly, as the dissent pointed out, “[s]o far as
we can tell from the meager record before us, no one—
including CDOJ—has ever tested any weapon against
California’s protocol to see whether it is technologically
feasible.”185 Therefore, the court upheld a safety requirement
that may be entirely impossible to comply with. There was no
evidence in the record that compliance with the California
mandate is possible. The effect of this law is extreme; it freezes
firearms technology in time.
Heller made clear that constitutional rights cannot be
technologically fossilized at some particular moment in history:
Id. at 986.
Id. at 983 (quotations omitted).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Pena, 898 F.3d at 988 (Bybee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
185 Id.
180
181
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Some have made the argument, bordering on the
frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the
18th century are protected by the Second
Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional
rights that way. Just as the First Amendment
protects modern forms of communications, e.g.,
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
844, 849, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997),
and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern
forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 35–36, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94
(2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima
facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable
arms, even those that were not in existence at the
time of the founding.186
The reasoning applies the same to the sixteenth century, the
eighteenth century and the twenty-first. Just as the government
cannot prohibit the freedom of speech through iPhones or the
internet, the government cannot prohibit the development of
the right to keep and bear arms through modern or future
technologies.
Judge Bybee concurred in part and dissented in part. He
joined in the portions of the majority opinion upholding the CLI
and MDM requirements. But he dissented regarding the
microstamping requirement due to his concern “that the testing
protocol adopted by the California Department of Justice [ ] in
its regulations is so demanding that no gun manufacturer can
meet it.”187 Judge Bybee noted that the infeasibility of the
microstamping requirement was preventing the MDM and CLI
requirements from being implemented:
Under the appropriate Second Amendment
analysis, I cannot conclude that there is a
reasonable fit between CDOJ’s microstamping
requirement and the legislature’s object in
solving handgun crimes. The result of CDOJ’s
restrictive testing protocol is undisputed: since
Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.
Pena, 898 F.3d at 988 (Bybee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
186
187
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at least 2013, no new handguns have been sold
commercially in California, and that means that
no guns were sold with the microstamping
feature. That fact has an important secondary
effect—it means that no new handguns are being
sold commercially with the MDM and CLI safety
features either.
The consequence is obvious. Today, no one in
California can purchase handguns that have the
safety features the legislature thought critical for
saving lives, nor can any Californian purchase
guns with the microstamping feature the
legislature thought important to assist police.
The only guns commercially sold in California
are grandfathered from these provisions. This is
a totally perverse result. If the legislature (or
CDOJ, seeking to implement the legislature’s
instructions) has adopted safety requirements
that no gun manufacturer can satisfy, then the
legislature has effectively banned the sale of new
handguns in California. The effect of this result
on our intermediate-scrutiny analysis is clear:
the fit between California’s interest in solving
handgun crimes and the microstamping
requirement would not only fail to be
reasonable, it would be non-existent. The
requirement would severely restrict what
handguns Californians can purchase without
advancing the State’s interest in solving
handgun crimes—or any government interest—
one iota.188
Judge Bybee conducted his own Two-Part analysis; he did not
make the assumptions the majority had made to fast-track the
analysis. He found that the microstamping requirement does
burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment; in Part
Two, he would have reversed and remanded based on the lack
of evidence in the record that firearms manufacturers are
capable of implementing the microstamping requirement
successfully.
188

Id. at 988–89 (Bybee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

128

7 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2020)

IX. TENTH CIRCUIT
A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR ARREST FOR LAWFUL OPEN
CARRY: SANDBERG V. ENGLEWOOD, COLORADO
On March 14, 2014, Westin Sandberg was running
errands in Englewood, Colorado, while open-carrying a 9mm
handgun on his hip. While in an auto shop—where he was
granted permission by the owner to continue carrying his
firearm—two officers confronted the Iraq War veteran with
their firearms drawn and seized his handgun and 21 rounds of
ammunition. After being detained for four hours, Sandberg was
charged with disorderly conduct, and his firearm, holster,
ammunition, and magazine were confiscated. Within months,
the charge was dropped, and Sandberg’s property was returned
to him.
Sandberg later filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that,
among other things, the officers violated his Second
Amendment rights “by detaining him, searching him, and
issuing him a citation, solely because he was openly carrying a
firearm.”189
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the claim was
properly dismissed by the district court because “when the
events at issue in this case occurred it was not clearly
established that the Second Amendment guaranteed a citizen
the right to openly carry a firearm in public without risk of
facing police action.”190 This was because “[t]here is no case
from the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court holding that
Heller’s articulation of a right to keep and bear arms inside the
home must necessarily extend to a right to keep and bear arms
outside the home.”191
The Tenth Circuit had previously held that the Second
Amendment does not guarantee the right to concealed carry.192
In another case, involving a prohibition against arms carrying
on United States Postal Service property, a 2-1 panel had

Sandberg v. Englewood, Colorado, 727 F. App’x 950, 961 (10th Cir.
2018).
190 Id. at 962.
191 Id. at 961.
192 Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013).
189
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declined to determine whether a right to bear arms exists but
had hypothesized such a right arguendo.193
The Sandberg court acknowledged a Seventh Circuit case
that definitively held that the right to bear arms applies beyond
the home,194 three circuit court cases that assumed the right
applies beyond the home,195 and a dissent from the denial of
certiorari in which Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch,
argued that “[t]he most natural reading of [the Second
Amendment] encompasses public carry.”196 But this was not
enough to “clearly establish” the right, as Sandberg needed to
do.

B. SHORT-BARRELED RIFLES AND SUPPRESSORS NOT
PROTECTED ARMS: U.S. V. COX
In 2013, Kansas passed the Second Amendment
Protection Act (SAPA).197 SAPA provides, in part:
A personal firearm, a firearm accessory or
ammunition that is manufactured commercially
or privately and owned in Kansas and that
remains within the borders of Kansas is not
subject to any federal law, treaty, federal
regulation, or federal executive action, including
any federal firearm or ammunition registration
program, under the authority of congress to
regulate interstate commerce. It is declared by
the legislature that those items have not traveled
in interstate commerce. This section applies to a
firearm, a firearm accessory or ammunition that
is manufactured commercially or privately and
owned in the state of Kansas.198

Bonidy v. United States Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015).
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
195 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko,
724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d
81 (2d Cir. 2012).
196 Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1998 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
197 Codified at Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-1201, -1211(2014).
198 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-1204(a).
193
194
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Relying on SAPA, Shane Cox began selling homemade
suppressors at his army-surplus store in Chanute, Kansas, with
a copy of SAPA posted next to the display case. Jeremy Kettler
purchased one; both parties believed the transaction was legal
under SAPA as long as the suppressor never left Kansas. In fact,
Kettler boasted about his new suppressor on Facebook.
Soon after, Cox and Kettler were charged with several
crimes:
[F]ederal prosecutors secured a grand jury
indictment against Cox and Kettler . . . Counts 2,
3, and 4 each charged Cox with possessing an
unregistered firearm—a destructive device, a
short-barreled rifle, and another destructive
device, respectively—in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d). Count 5 accused both Cox and Kettler of
conspiring, under 18 U.S.C. § 371, to violate the
NFA by building and selling an unregistered
silencer. Counts 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 charged Cox
with five violations of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(e) for
transferring five silencers—four to recipients
identified by their initials plus a fifth to “an
undercover law enforcement officer.” Cox R.
vol. 1 at 34. Count 10 accused Cox of making a
silencer in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f). Count
12 alleged that between June 20, 2014, and
February 4, 2015, Cox had “engaged in the
business of manufacturing and dealing in”
silencers in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(a). Cox
R. vol. 1 at 34. And count 13 charged Kettler with
possessing a silencer in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d).199
Cox and Kettler admitted that they violated the NFA but
appealed their convictions, arguing that the NFA is
unconstitutional and that SAPA provides them a valid defense.
First, the court held that “the NFA is a valid exercise of
Congress’s taxing power, as well as its authority to enact any
laws ‘necessary and proper’ to carry out that power.”200

199
200

United States v. Cox, 906 F.3d 1170, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1179.
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Second, the court considered whether the NFA
comports with the Second Amendment. Here, Cox and Kettler
presented different arguments, but they both maintained that
the Second Amendment protected their right to possess shortbarreled rifles and to make, sell, and possess suppressors.
Cox argued that the NFA was unconstitutional under
Heller. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit applied the Two-Part Test,
but none of the challenges made it past Part One. The Tenth
Circuit held that short-barreled shotguns fall outside the right’s
guarantee based on “Heller’s conclusion that short-barreled
shotguns—close analogues to short-barreled rifles—belong in
that category of weapons not typically possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes.”201
Turning to suppressors, the parties argued:
{S]ilencers are in common use (more common,
says Kettler, than handguns were in the District
of Columbia when the Court decided Heller) and
that they’re very rarely used to commit crimes—
“except on television and in the movies.”
Kettler’s Opening Br. at 34. Further, they claim
that silencers protect the shooter’s (and
bystanders’) hearing and, “by reducing muzzle
flinch and the disorientation that can follow a
loud shot,” can improve accuracy. Cox’s
Opening Br. at 45. And because the alternative—
donning earmuffs—takes up precious time and
suppresses surrounding sounds, they argue that
these hearing-protection and accuracy benefits
make silencers particularly valuable for “the
core lawful purpose of home defense.”202
This was irrelevant, however, because the court determined
that suppressors are not arms at all:
According to Heller, “the Second Amendment
extends, prima facie, to all instruments that
constitute bearable arms.” 554 U.S. at 582, 128
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1186. Earmuffs are not an “alternative” to sound suppressors;
each type of hearing protection supplements the other to further
reduce pressure on the ear drum.
201
202
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S.Ct. 2783 (emphasis added). An instrument
need not have existed at the time of the founding
to fall within the amendment’s ambit, but it must
fit the founding-era definition of an “Arm[
].” Id. at 581, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (citing two
dictionaries from the eighteenth, and one from
the nineteenth, century). Then and now, that
means, the Second Amendment covers
“[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence,” or
“any thing that a man wears for his defence, or
takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at
or strike another.” Id. at 581, 128 S.Ct. 2783
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). A
silencer is a firearm accessory; it’s not a weapon
in itself (nor is it “armour of defence”).
Accordingly, it can’t be a “bearable arm”
protected by the Second Amendment.203
Judge Hartz filed a short concurrence to emphasize that, “In
determining that silencers are not protected by the Second
Amendment, we explain that they are not ‘bearable arms.’ We
had no occasion to consider whether items that are not
themselves bearable arms but are necessary to the operation of
a firearm (think ammunition) are also protected.”204
The Tenth Circuit also upheld the NFA’s restrictions on
making and selling suppressors. The court explained that “[t]he
NFA’s requirements that firearms dealers and manufacturers
register and pay taxes annually fit neatly into that category of
‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’”205 identified by
Heller, including “laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms.”206 More importantly, the court
had already held that suppressors are not protected arms.
“Even if the Second Amendment covers the right to buy and
sell arms in the abstract, it can’t in practice protect the right to
buy and sell instruments, such as silencers, that fall outside its
ambit.”207

Id.
Id. at 1196.
205 Id. at 1187 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26).
206 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
207 Cox, 906 F.3d at 1187.
203
204
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Next, the court considered whether the NFA taxes
violate the Second Amendment by “imposing a charge for the
enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution.”208
“Under Murdock and Cox [v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941)], seminal cases in the Court’s ‘fee jurisprudence,’ the
government may collect a fee to defray administrative and
maintenance costs associated with the exercise of a
constitutional (usually First Amendment) right, but it can’t
impose a general revenue tax on the exercise of such a right.”209
The rule did not matter here, however, since the court had
already decided that short-barreled rifles and suppressors are
not protected by the right to arms.
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the
defendants’ reliance on SAPA was a valid defense. It was not.
“That general mistake-of-law rule forecloses Cox and Kettler’s
proposed defense—that they wrongly believed, in reliance on
the SAPA, that federal firearms regulations didn’t reach their
Kansas-centric activities. To be criminally liable, Cox and
Kettler didn’t need to know that their acts were ‘illegal, wrong,
or blameworthy.’”210 But as the court noted, “Cox’s and
Kettler’s reliance on the SAPA did, in the end, mitigate their
sentences, if not their guilt. . . That benefit turned out to be two
years’ probation for Kettler and one year’s for Cox. (The NFA
allows for a penalty of up to ten years in prison, a fine of up to
$10,000, or both for violating any of its provisions. 26 U.S.C. §
5871.).”211

CONCLUSION
The decisions of 2018 continue the post-Heller approach
of upholding all provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and
of the National Firearms Act of 1934. As usual, the prohibited
persons cases were easy under Heller and post-Heller circuit
doctrine.
Id. (quoting Murdock v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113
(1943)). It is worth noting that the right to keep and bear arms is not
granted by the Constitution. Rather, “it has always been widely
understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth
Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
209 Cox, 906 F.3d at 1187.
210 Id. at 1190 (quoting U.S. v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
211
Id. at 1195.
208
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Restrictions on firearms commerce were easy as applied
to unlicensed persons willfully selling arms to sketchy
characters. But the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding the ban on
handgun sales by federally licensed firearms dealers to
residents of consenting other states had questionable reasoning.
Nullification of the right to bear arms remains a
continuing problem in some states. In the Second Circuit,
treating the Second Amendment as a second-class right would
actually be an improvement from the current jurisprudence.
There, New York City was allowed to continue its meanspirited policy of preventing handgun owners in Staten Island
from practicing gun safety in New Jersey, prohibiting residents
of the Bronx from participating in target competitions in
Connecticut, and forbidding New York City residents to take
their registered handguns from one home to another.
There were a number of victories for the Second
Amendment in 2018. The Fifth Circuit protected the ability of
States to extend the right of self-defense to college campuses.
The Ninth Circuit recognized the right to bear arms (openly)
and the right to keep standard-capacity magazines. Based on
recent history, however, there is reason to expect that the en
banc court will reverse these well-reasoned decisions.
Although residents of the fifty States may not pay much
attention to U.S. Territories, the citizens of the Territories are
American citizens, and their rights are just as important as the
rights of other citizens. Accordingly, the final demise of the
racial ban, handgun ban, and self-defense ban in the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is good news
for ordered liberty.

